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THE QUESTION OF ENLIGHTENMENT: KANT, 
MENDELSSOHN, AND THE MITTWOCHSGESELLSCHAFT 
The Question and Its Context. Faced with the need to provide a quick 
characterization of the Enlightenment, few scholars have been able to 
resist invoking the opening of Kant's essay from 1784, "Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?": 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity 
is man's inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of 
another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, 
but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. 
The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! "Have courage to use 
your own understanding!"' 
Historians searching for a felicitous way of capturing the spirit of the 
age have cited it, philosophers hoping to incite a renewed devotion to 
the ideal of enlightenment have appealed to it, and present-day social 
critics-apparently in need of a bit of historical legitimacy-have some-
times wrapped themselves in its mantle.' Stylistically one of Kant's more 
spirited offerings, it has been the victim of its own success. An essay 
more often alluded to than analyzed, it may be well on its way to joining 
that unhappy company of texts which are frequently cited but rarely 
read.3 Indeed, at least one historian has questioned whether the essay is 
even worth reading: Franco Venturi has argued that the understanding 
of the European Enlightenment "from Kant to Cassirer and beyond" 
' Kant, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist AufkErung?," Kantsgesammelte Schriften. 
Akademie-Ausgabe (Berlin, 1904 ff.), hereafter "AA," VIII, 35, tr. H. B. Nisbet in Kant's 
Political Writings, ed. H .  Reiss (Cambridge, 1970), 54. 
Peter Gay appeals to Kant's definition on the opening page of the "Overture" to 
The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York, 1966-69), I, 3; Robert Anchor, The 
Enlightenment Tradition (Berkeley, 1967), holds off until page 7. Karl Popper finds in 
the essay a ringing proclamation of the principle of "emancipation through knowledge," 
a theme which he sees as the chief leitmotifofKant's own life; see "Kant's Critique and 
Cosmology," Conjectures and Refutations (New York, 1962), 175-77. Michel Foucault 
saw in it the origins of a "critical ontology of ourselves," a project which Foucault saw 
himself as carrying on; see "What is Enlightenment?," The Foucault Reader (New York, 
1984), 49-50. 
AS early as 1921, Gisbert Beyerhaus noted the "step-motherly" treatment the essay 
has typically received; see "Kants 'Program' der Aufkliirung aus dem Jahre 1784," in 
Zwi Batscha (ed.), Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt, 1976), 151. Two 
recent exceptions to the general neglect are Onora O'Neill, "The Public Use of Reason," 
Political Theory, 14 (1986), 523-51, and John Christian Laursen, "The Subversive Kant: 
The Vocabulary of 'Public' and 'Publicity,' " ibid., 14 (1986), 584-603. 
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has been dominated by a "philosophical interpretation of the German 
Aufkliirung" which blinds historians to the political dimension of the 
Enlightenment.4 
This much is clear. The endless invocation of Kant's definition has 
dulled our sense of its peculiarity and its novelty. Viewed from an eigh- 
teenth-century perspective, Kant's essay is notable for at least two reasons. 
First, like the similarly titled essay of his contemporary Moses Men- 
delssohn,' Kant's response to the question "What is Enlightenment?" 
recast what had been an issue of political policy into the language of 
philosophical reflection. Second, it redefined the philosophical principles 
at stake in the question of enlightenment in terms of a rather different 
understanding of the relationship between morality, politics, and history 
from that which dominated earlier contributions, including Mendels- 
sohnk6 Venturi's brief against Kant is partly valid: Kant's discussion of 
enlightenment may indeed have led subsequent commentators away from 
questions of power and politics. But perhaps this is only because those 
who have invoked Kant's definition have rarely explored the debate which 
his essay joined. 
My goal here is to restore Kant's essay to its original context: as one 
response to a question which was addressed by a number of other writers 
and debated in a number of other forums. I shall begin by examining 
the immediate provocation for Kant's essay, a question posed to the 
readers of the Berlinische Monatsschrift. After a brief sketch of the re- 
lationship of the Berlinische Monatsschrift to the Mittwochsgesellschaft, 
a secret society of "Friends of Enlightenment," I shall discuss the ex- 
tensive debate within the society sparked by a lecture by J. K. W. Mohsen, 
a prominent Berlin physician, on the question, "What is to be done 
towards the Enlightenment of Fellow Citizens?" My conclusion will 
examine the extent to which Kant's and Mendelssohn's essays-despite 
their more philosophical approach to the problem of enlightenment- 
still remain aware of the political dilemmas addressed by the Mittwochs- 
gesellscha ft. 
The "Berlinische Monatsschrift. " Mendelssohn's essay appeared in 
the September 1784 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift; Kant's ap- 
peared in the December issue. Both were ostensibly responding to a 
question which had been posed in the journal the previous December by 
Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1971), 1 -
17. 
Mendelssohn, " h e r  die Frage: was heisst aufkiiiren?" A. Altmann et a1 (eds.), 
Gesammelte Schriften Jubilaumsausgabe (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 197 Iff.), VI/ 1,  1 15-
19. 
For a comparison of their respective standpoints, see Frieder Liitzsch, "Moses 
Mendelssohn und Immanuel Kant im Gespriich iiber die Aufklarung," Wolfenbutteler 
Studien zur Aujllarung, 4 (1977), 163-86. 
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Johann Friedrich Ziillner, a pastor, theologian, and educational reformer 
with close ties to the group associated with the journal. Published between 
1783 and 1796, the Berlinische Monatsschrift was one of the main organs 
of the Aufklarung. Edited by Johann Erich Biester, the librarian of the 
royal library in Berlin, and Friedrich Gedike, a Prussian educational 
reformer and Gymnasium director, its regular contributors included both 
Kant (who published fifteen articles in it) and Mendelssohn (who con- 
tributed eight essays) as well as such other prominent figures in the 
Aufklarung as Christian Garve, Justus Moser, Friedrich Nicolai, and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt.' 
Zollner posed the question "What is Enlightenment?" almost as an 
afterthought in a rejoinder to yet another article in the journal: an essay, 
written by Biester but published anonymously, on the question of whether 
it was necessary for clergy to preside at wedding ceremonies. Biester had 
argued that the presence of the clergy led the "unenlightened citizen" 
to feel that the marriage contract was unique in that it was made with 
God himself, while other contracts "are only made with men, and are 
therefore less meaningful. " Because of this tendency to underestimate 
the importance of contracts which did not require clerical participation, 
Biester concluded that a purely civil wedding ceremony would be ap- 
propriate not only for the "enlightened citizen," who "can do without 
all of the ceremonies" but also for the unenlightened citizen, who would 
thus learn that all laws and contracts are to be equally re~pected.~ 
Biester's argument is misunderstood if it is seen simply as a demand 
for the removal of religious interference from public life. His analysis of 
the problem of clerical participation in marriage ceremonies is only the 
prelude to a much more ambitious and-to the twentieth-century 
reader-much more peculiar proposal: the creation of ceremonies which 
could provide religious support for all civil responsibilities, including 
marriage. "How excellent," Biester enthused, "if faith and civil duty 
were more integrated, if all laws had the sacredness of religious prescrip- 
tion. " 
Oh  when comes the time, that the concern for the religion of a state is no  longer 
the private monopoly of a few who often lead the state into disorder, but rather 
becomes itself again the business of the state. . . . Then we will have once again 
'After 1792 the journal moved from Berlin to Jena to escape the tightening of Prussian 
censorship laws after the death of Frederick 11. See Norbert Hinkse's introduction to his 
collection of essays published in it, Was ist Aufkliirung? Beitrage aus der Berlinischen 
Monatsschrift (Darmstadt, 1977), xx-xxiii. Ursula Schulz, Die Berlinische Monatsschrift 
(1783-1 796) Eine Bibliographie. Bremer Beitrage zur freien Volksbildung, XI (n.d.) con- 
tains a complete list of articles appearing in the journal and attempts to identify the 
authors of the many articles which were published anonymously or with only initials to 
indicate authorship. 
Berlinische Monatsschrift, 2 (1783), 268 (Hinske, 95). 
Ibid., 269 (Hinske, 99). 
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state, citizen, patriots; undefiled would be the debased names. . . . Let politics 
and religion, law and catechism be one!" 
Biester was concerned not with removing religion from civil society but 
rather with fostering a "civic religion " which, going beyond the religious 
neutrality and indifferentism that marked the reign of Frederick the 
Great, would introduce religious ritual into public life." 
In the response which occasioned Kant's and Mendelssohn's essays, 
Zollner argued that Biester's proposals were exceedingly ill-advised. A 
time when the first principles of morality had been weakened, when 
religion itself had been attacked, and when "under the name of enlight- 
enment the hearts and minds of men are bewildered" was not a time to 
toy with the institution of marriage, that most basic pillar of public 
order.'* Thc family stood in grave need of support, especially that support 
which the traditional religious denominations provided. Almost as an 
aside, in the course of his recitation of the dangers of an enlightenment 
run amok, Zollner inserted a footnote which read: "What is enlighten- 
ment? This question, which is almost as important as what is truth, 
should indeed be answered before one begins enlightening! And still I 
have never found it answered!"13 This, then, was the question Kant 
presumed both he and Mendelssohn were answering. But behind both 
Zollner's question and Mendelssohn's answer were a series of discussions 
of which Kant was apparently unaware. 
The Mittwochsgesellschaft. The Berlinische Monatsschrift functioned 
as the public organ of the Mittwochsgesellschaft ("Wednesday Society"), 
a secret society of "Friends of the Enlightenment" founded in 1783 and 
consisting of between twelve and twenty-four individuals who met on a 
regular basis to discuss the prospects and the consequences of enlight- 
enment.I4 In addition to Biester, Gedike, Zijllner, and Mendelssohn, its 
membership included such important figures in Berlin intellectual life as 
the writer Friedrich Nicolai and the philosopher Johann Jacob Engel.I5 
'O Ibid., 271-72(Hinske, 101-2). 
"For a brief discussion of Frederick's policy towards religion, see Gerhard Ritter, 
Frederick the Great: A Historical Profile, tr. Peter Paret (Berkeley, 1968), 16, 167-68. 
IZ Berlinische Monatsschrift, 2 (1783), 5 16 (Hinske, 1 1  5). 
l3 Ibid. 
l4 For discussions of the Mittwochsgesellschaft and its membership see Ludwig Keller, 
"Die Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft," Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft, V,3-4 
(1896), 70-73, 88-9 1; Heinrich Meisner, "Die Freunde der AufkErung. Geschichte der 
Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft," Festschrift zur 50phrigen Doktorjubelfeier Karl Wein- 
holds (Strasburg, 1896), 43-54; Hinske, Was ist AuJkliirung?, xxiv-xxxi, and Alexander 
Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (University, Alabama, 1973), 654- 
55. 

l5 See Horst Moller, Aujlclarung in Preussen: Der Verleger, Publizist und Geschichts- 
schreiber Friedrich Nicolai (Berlin, 1974), and, briefly, Henri Brunschwig, Enlightenment 
and Romanticism in Eighteenth-Century Prussia, tr. F. Jellinek (Chicago, 1974), 87-89. 
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A number of prominent officials within the Prussian bureaucracy were 
also members. The jurists Karl Gottlieb Svarez and Ernst Ferdinand 
Klein (both members of Frederick the Great's Department of Justice) 
were active participants, as were Christian Wilhelm Dohm (royal ar- 
chivist and well-known advocate of reforms in the treatment of Jews16) 
and the privy finance counsellors Karl August von Struensee and Johann 
Heinrich Wloemer." The Mittwochsgesellschaft also counted among its 
members the clergymen Johann Joachim Spalding, Johann Samuel Di- 
terich, and Wilhelm Abraham Teller, all of whom were prominent spokes- 
men for an enlightened approach to theology which stressed that, because 
the central tenets of Christian belief could be supported by rational 
arguments, there could be no contradiction between faith and reason.'' 
Finally, the membership included two physicians with ties to both the 
intellectual and political worlds: Johann Karl Wilhelm Mohsen (who 
was Frederick's own doctor and an historian of the sciences) and Chris- 
tian Gottlieb Selle (a privy counsellor whose interests spanned the fields 
of chemistry, physics, and philosophy). 
This group of civil servants, clergymen, and men of letters gathered 
twice a month during the winter months and once a month during the 
summer.lg At its meetings, which began at half-past six in the evening 
and ended with a dinner which began at around eight, two members 
would make presentations either in the form of a lecture or a brief 
statement of points for discussion. The statutes of membership excluded 
presentations on specialized issues in theology, jurisprudence, medicine, 
mathematics, or philology-where only a few members might have 
professional expertise-but allowed for discussions of these and other 
subjects insofar as they could be related to the more general concerns of 
"the enlightenment and the welfare of mankind. "'O After the presenta- 
tion, the rest of the membership would respond one by one, according 
to the order in which they were seated, with members permitted to speak 
l6 On Dohm and his contact with Mendelssohn during the composition of Dohm's 
treatise on the need for a reform of the civil status of Jews, see Altmann, 449-74, and 
Bmnschwig, 266-73. 
I' Struensee is remembered today chiefly for his widely-quoted claim to the French 
char& d'affaires in 1799 that, "The salutary revolution which you have made from 
below will come gradually in Prussia from above." See Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, 
Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815 (Boston, 1966), 161. 
l 8  See Joseph Schollmeier, Johann Joachim Spalding: Ein Beitrag zur Theologie der 
Aufklarung (Giitersloher, 1967). For the significance of clergymen within the Berlin 
Aufklarung, see Brunschwig, 23-26. 
l9 Biester set out some of the rules governing the meetings of the Mittwochsgesellschaft 
in a letter, written in the Spring of 1783, inviting Mendelssohn to become an "honorary 
member" of the society (regular participation in the society was impossible because of 
Mendelssohn's infirmities during his last years); see Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schrifen, 
XIII, 96-97; also Meisner, 48-50, and Altmann, 654. 
20 Meisner. 49. 
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a second time only after each of their colleagues had a chance to comment 
on the lecture. Notes taken on these discussions were subsequently cir- 
culated among the membership, along with the original lecture, and 
members were encouraged to attach additional written comments (termed 
Vota).Members were sworn to respect the opinions of their colleagues- 
no matter how nonsensical they might appear-and were forbidden to 
divulge what had been discussed to those outside the society or, indeed, 
even to disclose the existence of the society to those who were not 
members." 
The Mittwochsgesellschaft thus offered a setting where, in Mendels- 
sohn's words, "the enlightened part of the nation can put forward opin- 
ions among its own ranks in friendship and mutual trust. . . . "12 Like the 
other secret societies and "reading clubs" which proliferated throughout 
Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, the Mittwochsgesellschaft 
allowed men from differing walks of life to discuss matters of common 
concern in a setting which was free from the constraints and hierarchy 
of conventional society.23 The strict secrecy to which the members were 
pledged both allowed for the discussion of such politically sensitive issues 
as the proper direction of legal reform or the legitimacy of press censorship 
and enabled members to try out new ideas in a sympathetic setting before 
submitting them to scrutiny of others. Indeed, it was only because dis- 
cussions were carried on under what J. K. W. Mohsen called "the seal 
of secrecy" that the writers, clergymen, and civil servants who came 
together in the Mittwochsgesellschaft were free to fulfill what Mohsen 
regarded as their most important vocation: "the duty of good-minded 
patriots. "14 
On December 17, 1783-the month in which Zijllner's request for a 
definition of enlightenment appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift- 
Mohsen read a paper on the question "What is to be done towards the 
Enlightenment of Fellow citizen^?"^^ His lecture prompted comments 
from many of the members, and discussion continued through the next 
April, with Zollner and Selle contributing lectures on the same question 
21 For a discussion of published references to the society during the forty years after 
its founding, see Meisner, 43-45. 
22 Mendelssohn, " h e r  die Freiheit seine Meinung zu sagen" Gesammelte Schriften, 
VI/  1, 123-24. 
23 For the role of reading clubs and secret societies in the AufkErung see the brief 
discussions in Brunschwig, 38-40, and Moller, 232-38 and the more wide-ranging dis- 
cussions in Horst Moller, Vernunft und Kritik: Deutsche Aufkliirung im 17. und 18. 
Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, 1986), 213-3 1; Jurgen Habermas, Struktunvandel der bflentlich- 
keit (Neuwied, 1962); and Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis (Cambridge, Mass., 
1988). On the particular case of the Mittwochsgesellschaft see Keller, 91-94. 
24 J. K. W. Mijhsen, "Was ist zu thun zur Aufklarung der Mitburger?" reprinted in 
Keller, 75. 
25 For the text of the lecture, see Keller, 73-77. 
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in J a n ~ a r y . ~ ~  Mendelssohn wrote a short Votum regarding Mohsen's 
lecture on December 26, 1783, and the next May composed a longer 
response (which formed the basis of his subsequent article in the Berlin-
ische Monatsschrift) in response to the lectures by Zallner and Selle.27 
Thus the footnote which caught Kant's eye in Zallner's article was but 
the earliest public manifestation of a much more wide-ranging discussion 
which unfolded in secrecy inside the Mittwochsgesellschaft. 
The Prospects for Enlightenment: Mohsen's Lecture. While Zollner 
consigned the question "What is Enlightenment?" to a footnote, it served 
as Mohsen's point of departure. He began by reminding his colleagues 
that, "Our intent is to enlighten ourselves and our fellow citizens" and 
went on to observe that while the enlightenment of Berlin had been 
difficult, these difficulties had been overcome, and with luck "a spark, 
fanned here, might in time spread a light over all of Germany. . . . " But, 
he cautioned, if this goal is to be achieved, a number of problems must 
be addressed, first among them the question of determining more precisely 
"What is Enlightenment?"28 
Mohsen did not offer a definition of enlightenment. He instead called 
for a study of prejudice and superstition, suggesting that an understanding 
of their origins would further the enlightenment's goal of rooting out the 
most serious deficiencies in public reasoning and promoting those truths 
which are necessary for the public's well-being. Mohsen, however, had 
few illusions about how easily the obstacles to enlightenment could be 
surmounted. Indeed, what impressed him most about superstition and 
prejudice was their tenacity. He had begun by hailing the triumph of 
enlightenment in Berlin, but he rather quickly came around to suggesting 
that one of the most crucial tasks facing the Mittwochsgesellschaft was 
to determine why enlightenment had not been embraced by the public. 
The question "What is enlightenment?" gave way to the more troubling 
question of "why enlightenment has not progressed very far with our 
public, despite more than forty years of freedom to think, to speak, and 
also to publish. . . ."29 
The "forty years" of which Mohsen speaks refers to the reign of 
Frederick the Great, the Prussian monarch who has come to epitomize 
26 Norbert Hinske, "Mendelssohns Beantworung der Frage: Was ist AufkErung? oder 
h e r  die Aktualitiit Mendelssohns," Norbert Hinske (ed.), Ich handle mit Vernunjl. . . : 
Moses Mendelssohn und die europaische Aujklarung (Hamburg, 1981), 87-88. 
27 Altmann, 656, and Hinske, "Mendelssohns Beantworung der Frage: Was ist Auf- 
klarung," 88. 
28 Keller, 74. 
29 Ibid. 
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the curious political genre of "enlightened absolutism. "30 For the many 
members of the Mittwochsgesellschaft who worked within Frederick's 
bureaucracy, enlightenment was not merely an abstract ideal to be dis- 
cussed on Wednesday evenings. It was a practical question, involving 
day-to-day policy issues in the areas of law, religion, and public educa- 
t i ~ n . ~ 'In responding to these concerns, Frederick's Department of Justice 
had long played a prominent role. As a result of reforms undertaken in 
the late 1740s by Samuel von Cocceji, Frederick's Chancellor of Justice, 
the department had become one of the more active and progressive parts 
of the Prussian burea~cracy.~' Charged with the task of centralizing and 
rationalizing a system where courts typically served the interests of local 
nobility, Cocceji began a thorough reorganization of the department, 
introducing rigorous standards of recruitment, training, and promotion. 
As a consequence, the department held out the prospect of rapid ad- 
vancement to intelligent, university-trained members of the middle class, 
who, decades later, would gather in groups like the Mittwochsgesell- 
~ c h a f t . ~ ~  
The influence of this professionalization of the Prussian bureaucracy 
loomed large within the Mittwochsgesellschaft. Nobles who had inherited 
their titles-as opposed to recently ennobled members of the bureau- 
cracy-were prohibited from membership, and officials of the Justice 
Department were well represented in its ranks. Svarez and Klein had 
been brought to Berlin by Cocceji's successor, Johann Heinrich Kasimir 
von Canner, to work on the revision of the Prussian civil code which 
culminated in the Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794.34 Their presentations 
to the group developed some of the broader implications raised by their 
work, including such questions as the nature of legislation, the proper 
ends of the state, and the limits of freedom of speech and freedom of 
"For a recent overview of the now voluminous literature on the subject, see Charles 
Ingrao, "The Problem of 'Enlightened Absolutism' and the German States," Journal of 
Modern History, 58, suppl. (1986), S161-S180; also Der Aufgekliirte Absolutismus, ed. 
Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin (Cologne, 1974). 
3' The practical dimension of the question has been rightly stressed by H. B. Nisbet, 
" 'Was ist AufklLung?': The Concept of Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Ger- 
many," Journal of European Studies, 12 (1982), 84-87. 
"For a discussion of Cocceji and his reforms see Herman Weill, Frederick the Great 
and Samuel von Cocceji (Madison, 1961); Rosenberg, 123-34; and Hubert C. Johnson, 
Frederick the Great and His Officials (New Haven, 1975), 259-63. 
33 Johnson provides an analysis of the social composition of the bureaucracy in the 
appendices to Frederick the Great and his Officials, 288-91; on the class composition of 
reading societies see Moller, Aujlclarung in Preussen, 232-38. 
34 On the nature of von Carmer's efforts see Johnson, 259-63, who stresses that the 
commitment to rationalizing the administration of law did not preclude the conservation 
of traditional social hierarchies. On von Carmer's relation to Klein and Svarez, see Keller, 
72. 
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the press.35 The theologians Spalding, Diterich, and Teller were also 
connected to the Justice Department, albeit in a somewhat more round- 
about way. During the 1740s Cocceji gained control over the so-called 
"Spiritual Department," a moribund branch of the bureaucracy charged 
with the supervision of all ecclesiastical and higher educational institu- 
tions, and began a reorganization of the consistories of the Protestant 
confessions. These administrative bodies were composed of clergy and 
laymen (typically lawyers) and were assigned the responsibility of acting 
as mediators between the central bureaucracy and individual parishes. 
Beginning with the Lutheran Superior Consistory-on which Spalding, 
Diterich, and Teller served-Cocceji gave the consistories a wide range 
of powers including that of deciding what announcements were to be 
made from the pulpit, who would be appointed to fill openings in specific 
parishes, and even what education clergymen would receive in the uni- 
~ e r s i t i e s . ~~The interest of clergymen like Spalding, Diterich, and Teller 
in pedagogical reforms was shared by Gedike, Engel, and Karl Franz 
von Irwing, the director of the Joachimsthaler Gymnasium. Finally, the 
Privy Finance Counsellors von Struensee and Wloemer served in a branch 
of the bureaucracy which, like the Justice Department, was dominated 
by members of the middle class.37 
Thus when Mohsen reflected on the prospects for the enlightenment 
of the Prussian citizenry, he was examining an aspect of Prussian policy 
which had enjoyed the blessings of the monarch, the support of important 
branches of the bureaucracy, and the labors of educated members of the 
middle class, including the members of the Mittwochsgesellschaft. But 
the balance sheet he drew was hardly encouraging. Despite a forty-year 
effort at reforming the legal, ecclesiastical, and educational institutions 
35 For Klein and Svarez's role in the Mittwochsgesellschaft see Meisner, 52; according 
to Schulz (156), the article "In wiefern mussen Gesetze kurz sein?" Berlinische Mon- 
atsschrifr, 12 (1788), 99-112 had its origins as a lecture by Svarez before the Mittwochs-
gesellschaft on June 6, 1788; Klein later claimed credit for the anonymous article " ~ b e r  
Denk- und Druck-freiheit. An Fursten, Minister, und Schriftsteller," Berlinische Mon- 
atsschrifr, 3 (1784), 3 12-30 (see Hinske, 5 17). Klein's dialogue with the French National 
Assembly, Freiheit und Eigenthum (Berlin und Stettin, 1790), also derives from discus- 
sions within the Mittwochsgesellschaft; for an analysis, see Gunter Birtsch, "Freiheit und 
Eigentum," ed., R. Vierhaus, Eigentum und Verfassung (Gijttingen, 1972), 179-92. Fi- 
nally, the Berlinische Monatsschrifr published a series of anonymous-and to date un- 
credited-articles on the new Prussian constitution: "ijber die neue Preussische 
Justizverfassung," Berlinische Monatsschrift, 3 (1784), 243-49, 330-35, 521-30, and 4 
(1784), 56-63. 
"On the function of the consistories, see Brunschwig, 23; on Cocceji's reorganization, 
see Johnson, 126-28, and Weill, 85. 
"Finance Councillors were a part of the "General Directory," the oldest and, until 
Ludwig von Hagen introduced reforms in the 1760s which paralleled the efforts of von 
Cocceji in the 1740s, the least professionalized branch of the bureaucracy. But as early 
as 1754, only two of the eighteen privy finance councillors were nobles. See Johnson, 
218-23, 231-32, 288. 
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of the nation, the ideals of enlightenment had not been embraced by the 
population. Superstition and prejudice still reigned even within the al- 
legedly enlightened city of Berlin. 
Removing the Obstacles to Enlightenment. In defining enlightenment 
by counterposing it to prejudice and superstition, Mohsen was only fol- 
lowing a well-established convention within the Berlin Aufiliirung. When 
Biester and Gedike launched the Berlinische Monatsschrift with the hope 
that the journal's collaborators would share a "love for the dissemination 
of useful enlightenment and for the banishment of pernicious error," it 
was clear that they felt that the chief utility of enlightenment was its 
ability to banish error.3s Truth drives out falsehood, just as light drives 
away darkness: the imagery was simple and incessantly invoked.39 
The "errors" which received most attention in the Berlinische Mon- 
atsschrijit were those which flourished in popular religion and public 
customs. They were typically denoted by the epithets "superstition" 
(Aberglaube) and "fanaticism" (Schwiirmerei). For Biester, one of the 
more effective ways of "robbing superstition of at least some of its 
adherents" was to expose popular beliefs to the light of "publicity." For 
example, in the August 1783 issue of the journal Biester published a brief 
report recounting how, in response to a rumor that Berlin would be 
destroyed on July 11, a considerable number of individuals had fled the 
city. Bringing such absurd behavior before the eyes of the public might 
make it less likely that similar rumors would be believed in the f ~ t u r e . ~ "  
Likewise, the printing of a report by the state physician Johann Theodor 
Pyl on the activities of the "Moon Doctor of Berlin "-a practitioner of 
"astral medicine" who in 1780-81 built a sizable practice by treating 
patients with "moonshine and prayer "-could serve to alert the public 
that "no less than religion does medicine have its fanatics. "41 By the end 
of 1784 short anecdotes recounting cases of religious fanaticism, char- 
latanry, and quackery were a regular feature of the journaL4' 
More subtle responses to the public's gullibility were also available. 
The lead article in the first issue of the journal was an essay by Kant's 
Editors' foreword, Berlinische Monatsschrift, 1 (1783), vii-viii (Hinske, 3). 
39 For one particularly tedious invocation of the metaphors, see Christoph Martin 
Wieland's "Sechs Fragen zur Aufklarung," Ehrhard Bahr (ed.), Was ist Aujlclarung? 
Thesen und Definitionen (Stuttgart, 1974), 23-28. 
40 Biester, "Der gefiirchtete elfte Julius in Berlin," Berlinische Monatsschrift, 2 (1783), 
143-50. 
41 Biester, "Der Monddoktor in Berlin," Berlinische Monatsschrift, 1 (1783), 353-56; 
for a discussion of the spread of medical quackery which includes a brief account of the 
Moon Doctor's activities see Brunschwig, 190-204. 
42 See the "Anekdoten" columns in the issues of November and December 1784 
(Berlinische Monatsschrift, 4, 428-46 and 536-55); the column continued in future issues 
on an irregular basis, sometimes written by Biester, other times by unidentified corre- 
spondents. 
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future critic Johann August Eberhard, a professor of philosophy at Halle 
and a friend of Mendelssohn, which examined the origin of the belief 
that the ghostly figure of a woman dressed in flowing white clothing 
often appears in a household when a male family member is about to 
die. After tracing the history of the legend and subjecting the tale to a 
rigorous philological and historical scrutiny, Eberhard argued that the 
superstition ultimately rested on a misunderstanding of a harmless figure 
of speech. In the middle ages princesses and queens mourned the deaths 
of spouses by dressing in white, and a common way of asking if the king 
had died was to question whether a "white woman" had appeared in 
the royal household. Over time, the appearance of the "white woman" 
was transformed from a customary consequence of the death of royalty 
into an omen of the death of the male head of the household.43 
Articles like Eberhard's were perhaps the journal's finest achievement. 
subsequent issues readers could find meticulously documented studies 
everything from the twisted reasoning which reigned at witch trials 
to the influence of the Roman Saturnalia on Christmas custom^.^ The 
motivation for this relentless display of erudition was a deeply felt hope 
that the insights achieved through an often dazzling combination of 
historical research, philological criticism, and philosophical analysis 
would have practical consequences. Eberhard perhaps expressed the in- 
tent best when he began his study by stating, "Of all the means of opposing 
superstition, none appears surer to me than research into the origins of 
legends and fables. . . . " Many individuals, he explained, lack the "phil- 
osophical spirit, or critical sharp-mindedness, or historical knowledge" 
to reject superstition completely. But it is possible to free individuals 
from the spell of particular superstitions by carefully demonstrating their 
origins and subsequent spread.45 By uncovering the true meaning of the 
fable of the white woman, Eberhard sought "to free the heart of the 
faithful Christian from an unchristian fear. "46 
In a postscript Gedike praised Eberhard for neither simply denouncing 
superstition nor merely appealing to common sense. Superstition, Gedike 
observed, can repulse such attacks rather easily. Eberhard, however, had 
embraced the far more effective strategy of tracing the often obscure 
history of the fable back to its birthplace to reveal "the paltry and 
miserable cradle of the alleged giant, which only blind credulity and deaf 
43 Eberhard, " h e r  den Ursprung der Fabel von der weissen Frau," Berlinische 
Monatsschrift, 1 (1783), 3-22 (Hinske, 5-24). 
44 G. C. Voigt, "Etwas iiber die Hexenprozesse in Deutschland," Berlinische Mon- 
atsschrifr, 3 (1784), 297-311 (Hinske, 50-64) and Gedike, " ~ b e r  den Ursprung der 
Weihnachtsgeschenke," Berlinische Monatsschrift, 3 (1784), 73-87 (Hinske, 80-94). 
45 Eberhard, 3 (Hinske 5). 

46 Eberhard, 4 (Hinske 6). 
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nayvet6 made a giant."47 The tyranny of superstition is ended not by 
ridicule but rather by interpretation. The point of enlightenment was not 
to make fun of the stupidity of a public which remained under the sway 
of the superstitions of popular religion; its goal instead was to free the 
public from those fears which robbed them of that happiness which was 
the goal of all human a~sociation.~~ 
But the very vigor with which Biester, Gedike, and their colleagues 
entered the fray against superstition and fanaticism suggested that the 
giant had not yet been turned into an infant. And many times the authors 
of the articles which sought to banish superstition marvelled at how 
remarkable it was that such things could still be believed in Berlin.49 
This, of course, was Mohsen's point: after forty years of official support 
for religious toleration, enlightened approaches to theology, and freedom 
of expression, why was there still so much prejudice, superstition, and 
fanaticism to combat? 
Mohsen argued that superstition continued to exist because enlight- 
enment had not gone far enough. In order to enlighten others, the friends 
of enlightenment needed to enlighten themselves about the causes of 
superstition and fanaticism. Armed with this knowledge they could de- 
stroy the errors in the public's understanding at their very roots, pre- 
sumably using the weapons which the Berlinische Monatsschrift was only 
now bringing into play. But while Mohsen betrayed few doubts as to the 
appropriateness of the strategy which the Berlinische Monatsschrift had 
embraced, he suggested in closing that there was one other actor in the 
struggle against superstition and fanaticism whose role needed to be 
reexamined: the Prussian state. 
The time had come, Mohsen announced, to reconsider the relationship 
between enlightenment and the state. Indeed, he noted, such a review 
had already begun, and conveniently enough, it had the blessings of the 
monarch. In 1778 the Berlin Academy announced an essay competition 
on the question "Is it useful to deceive the people?. The question had 
been urged on the Academy by Frederick himself, who had been dis- 
cussing the issue in his correspondence with D'Alembert and who, before 
assuming the throne, had given an unequivocal answer to the question 
47 Gedike, "Nachtrag zu der Legende von der weissen Frau," Berlinische Monats- 
schrift, 1 (1783), 24 (Hinske, 26). 
48 Zollner, "Etwas von Vorurteilen und Aberglauben," Berlinische Monatsschrift, 1 
(1783), 468-75. 
49 Gedike, "Nachtrag. . . ," 42 (Hinske, 44); Biester, "Der gefiirchtete elfte Ju- 
lius. . . ," 149. 
For the historical background to the question, see Werner Krauss, "Eine politische 
Preisfrage im Jahre 1780," Studien zur deutschen und franwsischen Aufklarung (Berlin, 
1963), 63-71. 
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in his Anti-Machia~el.~' theThere he had argued against Machiavelli-" 
meanest, the most scoundrelly of men9'-that "falseness and dissimu- 
lation can never prevail" against a public which "sees, hears, and divulges 
everything" and judges princes by their actions instead of their words.52 
His reign had begun in this spirit with an easing of censorship laws and 
a toleration of divergent views on religious questions. But as Lessing 
wrote to Nicolai in 1769, all this really amounted to was a freedom "to 
make as many idiotic remarks against religion as one wants. " Freedom 
of expression was not extended into the political domain; and contrasting 
what could be said in Prussia about political issues with what was being 
written in Vienna, France, and Denmark, Lessing concluded that Fred- 
erick ruled over "the most enslaved land in E~rope . " '~  With the an- 
nouncement of the Academy's question, such private doubts regarding 
the legitimacy and utility of censorship began to be discussed in 
The competition proved to be one of the most popular of the century 
with forty-four essays being submitted for consideration. Of the thirty- 
three essays which met the formal requirements and were passed on for 
consideration, thirteen answered the question in the affirmative and the 
other twenty found no utility in the deception of the public. The Academy, 
already chastened by Frederick's rejection of their initial proposal for 
the competition-a rather esoteric problem in Leibnizian metaphysics 
which Frederick dismissed as ignoring the point of the prize competitions 
in speculative philosophy (they were supposed to be "interesting and 
have a utility ") 55-prudently awarded prizes for both "yes " and "no" 
responses and published the two winning essays in 1780. Mohsen was 
not impressed. The decision to award two prizes only showed that the 
Academy had been unable to make up its mind. He urged his colleagues 
in the Mittwochsgesellschaft to take up the challenge which the Academy 
"The book was written during the fall and winter of 1739-40, with Frederick sub- 
mitting the work to Voltaire for criticism. Despite misgivings about Frederick's rather 
repetitious style, Voltaire offered to have the work published. Frederick quickly began 
to have second thoughts about the work, fearing it might offend other princes, and when 
he assumed the throne on May 31, 1740, he begged Voltaire to "buy up every edition 
of the Anti-Machiavel." Needless to say, Voltaire failed. See Paul Sonnino's introduction 
to his translation of the Anti-Machiavel (Athens, Ohio, 1981), 13-14. 
52 Anti-Machiavel, Ch. XVIII (tr. 112-13). 
53 Lessing to Nicolai August 25, 1769 in Lessing, Samtliche Schriften, ed. Lachmann 
and Muncker (Leipzig, 1904), XVII, 298. For a discussion of Frederick's views on 
censorship, see Franz Schneider, Pressefreiheit und politische bflentlichkeit (Neuwied, 
1966), 64-66. For an examination of the rather limited range of public discussion in 
eighteenth-century Prussia, see Thomas Saine, "Was ist AufkErung?" Aufklarung, Ab- 
solutismus und Burgertum in Deutschland, ed. Franklin Kopitzsch (Munich, 1976), 332- 
38. 
54 For a discussion of the campaign for freedom of the press and freedom of speech 
in Prussia during the last quarter of the century see Mijller, Aufklarung in Preussen, 208-
25, and, more generally, Schneider, 101-45. 
55 See Frederick's cabinet order to the Academy of October 16, 1777, in Krauss, 69. 
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had fumbled and determine "if our efforts . . . are useful or harmful to 
the state and the g~vernmen t . "~~  To ask this question was to open a 
debate on the politically sensitive issue of whether there was a need to 
limit the enlightenment of the public. 
The Limits of Enlightenment. In the discussion which Mohsen's lec- 
ture provoked, the amorphous and seemingly harmless topic of the current 
status of public enlightenment was transformed rather quickly into a 
debate on the utility and legitimacy of press censorship. The members 
of the Mittwochsgesellschaft divided into two camps. Some followed Moh- 
sen's lead and argued that the proper remedy for the difficulties that 
enlightenment faced was a simple one: more enlightenment. Others took 
up Zollner's response to Biester and warned that if the public embraced 
the teachings of enlightenment too eagerly, the conventional mores and 
beliefs on which society rested might be undermined. 
Mendelssohn's initial response to Mohsen's lecture, dated December 
26, 1783, took a rather skeptical stance towards the fear of too much or 
too rapid an enlightenment of the public. He requested that those troubled 
by such prospects provide "examples from history . . . where either en- 
lightenment in general, or unrestricted freedom of expression in partic- 
ular, have done actual harm to public happine~s."~' He reminded the 
fainthearted that "When weighing the advantages and disadvantages 
brought about by enlightenment and the revolutions which have arisen 
from it, one should differentiate between the first years of a crisis and 
the times which follow. The former are sometimes only seemingly dan- 
gerous and are the grounds for improvement. " And even if one conceded 
that it might be true that "certain prejudices, held by the nation, must 
on account of circumstances be spared by all judicious men," Mendels- 
sohn asked whether this deference to prejudices should "be set through 
law and censors" or whether, like "the limits of prosperity, gratitude, 
and sincerity," it should be "left to the discretion of every individual." 
He closed his Votum by noting that recently the Montgolfier brothers 
had made the first successful hot-air balloon flight. Even though it was 
uncertain whether the "great upheaval" caused by their achievement 
would lead to "the betterment of human society," Mendelssohn asked 
the membership, "would one on account of this hesitate to promote 
progress?" Answering his own question, he concluded, "The discovery 
56 Keller, 75. 
"When the lecture and the attached Vota reached the privy finance counselor Wloe- 
mer the next February, he suggested that the final phase of "the history of the Greeks 
and Romans" provided the examples Mendelssohn requested (Keller, 87). 
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of eternal truths is in and for itself good; their control is a matter for 
providence. "58 
Mendelssohn's arguments were seconded by many in the society. 
Dohm for instance, wondered whether much could be learned from 
reviewing the Academy's prize essays: "it is not so difficult a thing to 
determine that one must not deceive the people and that truth and 
enlightenment always make men happy and that artifice here serves 
nothing. "Echoing Mendelssohn's call for some actual historical examples 
of the alleged harm caused by too much enlightenment, he concluded, 
"Surely no one can cite a case where the momentary harm of the crisis 
(or the unrest bound up with the downfall of despotism and superstition) 
has not resolved into a greater good."59 Von Irwing agreed with Men- 
delssohn and Dohm and suggested that those frightened by the prospects 
of enlightenment should remember that similar fears greeted Jesus and 
L~ the r . ~ 'And the publicist Nicolai, an outspoken champion of the free- 
dom of expression, argued that the press was now so oppressed that "one 
has more to fear in terms of disadvantages to truth and happiness from 
the smallest restriction than from the greatest extension" of the freedom 
of the press.61 
But others in the MittwochsgeseIlscha~were more wary of the con- 
sequences of an unfettered enlightenment. The jurist Klein was willing 
to concede that in general "every truth is useful and every error harmful. " 
But he also insisted that it was necessary to consider the practical impact 
of enlightenment on different groups within society. Because it is some- 
times difficult to assimilate individual, isolated truths, these truths will 
remain unconvincing and without effect. It is thus possible that "for a 
certain class of men, a certain error can serve to bring them to a higher 
concept of things which are worthy of greater attention." In such cases 
a "useful error" will do more to promote the public good than the truth.62 
Svarez agreed with his colleague, noting that the morality of the general 
public rests on beliefs which are "uncertain, doubtful, or completely 
wrong" and suggesting that enlightenment is dangerous when it "takes 
from the people these motives of ethically good behavior and substitutes 
no other." In such cases "one advances not enlightenment but rather a 
corruption of morality. "" 
The points raised by Svarez and Klein were seconded by Gedike, who 
stressed that enlightenment was a "relative" concept which was differ- 
''Keller, 80-81 (also in Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften VI/ 1 ,  113). For a dis- 
cussion of the excitement which greeted the first balloon flights, see Darnton, Mesmerism 
and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 18-22. 
59 Keller, 86. 

Ibid., 88. 

6LIbid., 83. 

Ibid., 77-78. 

63 Ibid., 79. 
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entiated according to such criteria as "place, time, rank, sex." "Tho- 
roughgoing equality of enlightenment," he assured his fellow members, 
"is as little desirable as full equality of ranks, and fortunately just as 
impossible." Gedike saw the enlightenment of a nation as consisting of 
"the collective summation of the differentiated grades of enlightenment 
among the different ranks." It begins of necessity with the middle class 
and "the rays of enlightenment only gradually spread to the two extremes, 
the upper and the lower ranks. "64 
Because enlightenment is differentiated according to the differing 
ranks in society, it falls to the censor to determine, in Svarez's words, 
"the degree of enlightenment of powers of comprehension, of capacities 
of thought and action, and of expressive capabilities" appropriate to each 
class.65 The censor is concerned with neither the truth nor the compre- 
hensiveness of a work. Rather, attention is directed to the work's potential 
audience and to the probable effect of the work on that audience. "If I 
wrote a morality for the common man," Klein explained, 
the censor cannot condemn my book because I have nothing to say about the 
duty to take oaths. If I said, however, that the soldier is obliged to nothing 
through his oath to which he is not already bound as a citizen of the state or 
by virtue of its initial contract, the censor must prohibit the publication of the 
book, even if he is of the same opinion. It is entirely different if I express this 
proposition in a philosophical treatise. I can assume that such writings will not 
come into the hands of soldiers.66 
Svarez agreed. He saw no need for the censorship of scholarly books and 
journals directed at the enlightened part of the nation; here an unrestricted 
freedom of the press was appropriate. But writings directed at the general 
public were an entirely different matter. While Svarez expressed an ad- 
miration for the efforts of his colleagues to refine and rationalize morality 
and religion, he nevertheless hoped that they would "not seek to explain 
away and define away hell and the devil, in the usual sense of these 
words, from the heart of the common man. "67 Nothing maintains public 
order better, it would seem, than a little superstition. 
Enlightenment and the Social Order: Mendelssohn and Kant. In Moh- 
sen's lecture, and in the discussion which followed, the difficulties which 
faced the Mittwochsgesellschaft-and, beyond it, the Aufiliirung in gen- 
eral-came to the fore. To ask "What is Enlightenment?" in 1783 was 
to enter into a nest of contradictions. The Mittwochsgesellschaft was a 
society committed to the enlightenment of the public-but for reasons 
64 Ibid., 85. 

6s Ibid., 79. 

66 Ibid., 78. 

67 Ibid., 79. 
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of prudence, its members felt compelled to conceal even the existence of 
the society from the public it sought to enlighten. The results of their 
discussions were to reach the public through the Berlinische Monats- 
schrift-but, as Mendelssohn himself recognized, any publication of these 
discussions would of necessity have to remove all references to the most 
important thing the Mittwochsgesellschafi discussed: the question of how 
much could be revealed to the The aim of both the Mittwochs- 
gesellschaft and the Berlinische Monatsschrift was the enlightenment of 
the public-but an enlightenment of the citizenry might very well result 
in the erosion of those customs and prejudices on which public order 
rested. 
For the members of the Mittwochsgesellschafi the "enlightening of 
the citizenry" was a matter of public policy, and the attainment of the 
goal involved such down to earth questions as how clergy might combat 
the superstitions of their congregations, how schools might be reformed, 
and how the administration of justice might be rationalized. So long as 
enlightenment was treated as a political question, discussions of the nature 
of enlightenment were forced to consider what it would mean to enlighten 
a society where individuals enjoyed rights only insofar as they were 
members of particular ranks or estates. In their work on the Allgemeines 
Landrecht Svarez and Klein coupled a theoretical conception of the state 
as a social contract between free and equal individuals with a codification 
of laws which conceived of civil society as a union of estates and cor- 
porations, each with their own peculiar rights and privilege^.^^ A similar 
collision between general ideals and concrete political realities pervades 
the Mittwochsgesellschaft's entire discussion of the nature of enlighten- 
ment. Citizens have a right to be free from fear, superstition, and prej- 
udice, but only as free from fear, superstition, and prejudice as their rank 
in society permitted. 
In the essays by Kant and Mendelssohn this tension between the 
ideals of enlightenment and the realities of politics is less obvious. When 
Kant defined enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity" or when Mendelssohn presented enlightenment as working 
together with "culture" (Kultur) and "education" (Bildung) to fulfill 
the "destiny of man" (Bestimmung des Menschens), the question of 
enlightenment is no longer being treated as a matter of practical politics.70 
From within the Mittwochsgesellschaft, Mendelssohn looked back to the 
legacy of Wolffian philosophy and drew up a "catalogue of problems, a 
dense compendium of the themes which characterized the contemporary 
68 Mendelssohn, " ~ b e r  die Freiheit seine Meinung zu sagen," Gesammelte Schriften 
VI/  1, 123-24. 
69 For a discussion of the tension in the Allgerneines Landrecht see Reinhart Koselleck, 
Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution (Stuttgart, 1967), 52-77. 
'O Kant, AA, VIII, 35 (Political Writings, 54); Mendelssohn, " ~ b e r  die Frage: was 
heisst aufklaren?," in Gesammelte Schriften, VI/  1, 115. 
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discussion of Enlightenment. "71 Outside the immediate circle of the Mitt-
wochsgesellschaft Kant reformulated the notion of enlightenment in the 
terminology of the Critique of Pure Reason. Both essays step back from 
the immediate practical concerns on which the discussions within the 
Mittwochsgesellschaft had concentrated. But something of the tension 
between ideal and reality survives, even in the more abstract discussions 
of Kant and Mendelssohn. Indeed, now that we have examined the 
debates within the Mittwochsgesellschaft, the political dimension which 
Venturi found absent from discussions such as Kant's should be a bit 
easier to see. For both Kant and Mendelssohn no less than for Mohsen 
and his cohorts, the question "What is Enlightenment?" was intimately 
intertwined with the problem of how far enlightenment could be pursued 
without having an adverse effect on society. 
After announcing that the "destiny of man" is the goal which en- 
lightenment must always keep in sight, Mendelssohn considered the pos- 
sibility of a tension between the "destiny of man as man" and the "destiny 
of man as citizen."72 While the "enlightenment of man" (Menschen-
aujklarung) knows no audience other than "man as man" and hence 
pays no heed to social distinctions or to the maintenance of social order, 
Mendelssohn insisted that the "enlightenment of the citizen" (Biirger-
aujklarung) must adjust itself according to the ranks of society it ad- 
dresses. "Certain truths which are useful to man, as man," he noted, 
"can at times be harmful to him as citizen."73 SO long as the "collision" 
between the Enlightenment of man and the Enlightenment of citizen is 
confined to matters which do not directly address the "essential" destiny 
of man as man or of man as citizen-and thus do not put into question 
either those aspects of man which distinguish him from animals or those 
civic duties which are necessary for the preservation of public order- 
Mendelssohn saw little cause for concern and argued that rules can easily 
be drawn up to resolve potential conflicts.74 But when a conflict arises 
between the "essential" destiny of man as citizen and either his "essen- 
tial" or his "fortuitous" destiny as man, the choices facing the partisan 
of enlightenment become more difficult. The most severe conflict occurs 
in those "unhappy" states when the "essential" destinies of man as man 
and man as citizen collide. In such cases the enlightenment which man, 
as man, requires cannot spread "through all classes of the realm" without 
threatening the very fabric of society. "Here philosophy lays its hand on 
71 Hinske, "Mendelssohns Beantworung der Frage: Was ist AufkErung?," 88. 
72 Mendelssohn took the concept of the "destiny of man" from a book by his fellow 
member of the Mittwochsgesellschaft, J. J. Spalding, Betrachtung iiber die Bestimmung 
des Menschen, first published in 1748 and reprinted in numerous editions in the eighteenth 
century. For a discussion of the centrality of the notion in Mendelssohn's work, see 
Hinske, "Mendelssohns Beantworung der Frage: Was ist AufkErung?" 94-99. 
73 Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, VI/ 1, 117. 
74 Ibid. 
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its mouth! Necessity may here prescribe laws, or forge fetters, which are 
applied to man, to force him down, and hold him under its yoke!"75 
When man's "essential" destiny as a citizen collides with his "fortuitous" 
destiny as man, the consequences are less grim. Here it is not a question 
of a state violating man's essential humanity, but rather of a situation 
where "certain useful and-for mankind-adorning truths may not be 
disseminated without the current fundamental propositions of religion 
and morality being torn down. "76 Despite the skepticism voiced in his 
initial Votum on Mohsen's lecture, Mendelssohn came to agree with those 
of his colleagues in the Mittwochsgesellschaft who saw a need to set limits 
to enlightenment and concluded that in such cases the "virtue-loving 
Aufklarer will . . . endure prejudice rather than drive it away along with 
that truth with which it is so tightly i n t e r t ~ i n ed . "~~  
Many of the same concerns haunt Kant's defense of enlightenment. 
After the spirited opening definition of Aufkliirung as man's exit from 
his self-imposed immaturity, Kant invokes a distinction between "public" 
and "private" uses of reason which countless subsequent commentators- 
beginning with Mendelssohn himself-have found puzzling at best.78 The 
"public" use of reason is that use "which anyone may make of it as a 
man of learning addressing the entire reading public [ganzen Publikum 
der Leserwelt]." The "private" use of reason is that use which "a person 
may make of it in a particular civil post or office [with] which he is 
entrusted. "79 In one's private use of reason, one behaves "'passively," as 
"part of a machine," bound by an "artificial accord" (kiinstliche Ein- 
helligkeit) to promote certain "public ends." In this context it is "im- 
permissible to argue." In one's public use of reason, one acts as "a 
member of the complete commonwealth [ganzes gemeinen Wesen] or 
even of a cosmopolitan society [Weltbiirgergesellschaft]." Here an indi- 
vidual "may indeed argue without harming the affairs in which he is 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 118. 
77 Ibid. 
78 In a Votum in response to a discussion of Kant's essay within the Mittwochsge-
sellschaft, Mendelssohn described Kant's distinction between public and private uses as 
"somewhat strange" (Gesammelte Schriften, VIII, 227). Subsequent commentators have 
found it stranger still: Susan Meld Shell finds it odd that Kant should classify the 
"discourse of the public official" as a "private use of reason" (The Rights of Reason 
[Toronto, 19801, 171), while Ronald Beiner characterizes Kant's distinction as "some- 
thing of an inversion of traditional liberal priorities on the part of one of the leading 
fountain heads of liberal thought" ("Hannah Arendt on Judging," Hannah Arendt, 
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy [Chicago, 19821, 123). The difference between 
Kant's argument for toleration and the typical liberal defense is discussed at length in 
O'Neill, "The Public Use of Reason," 523-51. 
79 AA, VIII, 37 (Political Writings, 55). In his Votum Mendelssohn glossed Kant's 
distinction as a contrast between "vocational" and "extra-vocational" uses of reason; 
Gesammelte Schrifen, VIII, 228. 
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employed in part in a private capacity." Restrictions on the private use 
of reason in no way contradict the goal of enlightenment, but the public 
use of reason must remain free, since "it alone can bring about enlight- 
enment among men. 
Kant's distinction between public and private uses of reason becomes 
a bit less puzzling once it is recognized that for him the private sphere 
is "never a conception of the merely individual or per~onal ."~~ Private 
uses of reason take place in a sphere of contractual agreements where 
individuals alienate their talents to others for the purpose of advancing 
common goals. Thus, to invoke Kant's examples, an army officer has 
agreed to carry out the commands given by superiors, citizens have agreed 
to pay those .taxes which a state has imposed, and a clergyman has agreed 
to deliver sermons to pupils in catechism or to his congregation which 
conform to the guidelines established by his faith.82 Kant gave scant 
attention to the first two examples and chose instead to concentrate on 
the question of the responsibilities of the clergyman. The choice is not 
arbitrary, nor need it be written off to the exigencies of cen~orship.~~ The 
explanation of Kant's interest in the question leads us back once again 
to Zollner, Mendelssohn, and the Berlinische Monatsschrift. 
The legitimacy of the oaths of allegiance which clergymen were re- 
quired to swear to the "symbols" of their faith had become a matter of 
heated discussion in the decade before the writing of Kant's essay. In 
1773 Nicolai had written a satirical novel about a Lutheran minister who 
was dismissed for deviating from his oath, and Mendelssohn, in his 
recently published Jerusalem, had mounted an extended attack on the 
practice of requiring such affirmations of faith.84 Mendelssohn's argument 
had been criticized both by Ziillner and by Johann David Michaelis, an 
Orientalist who had earlier argued against the extension of civil rights 
to Jews on the grounds that any oaths they might swear could not be 
taken se r io~s ly .~~  Mendelssohn dispensed with Michaelis's personal-and 
AA, VIII, 37 (Political Writings, 56) .  
*'O'Neill, 530; see also Thomas Auxter, "Kant's Conception of the Private Sphere," 
The Philosophical Forum, 12 (1981),  295-310. 
82 AA VIII, 37-38 (Political Writings, 56).  In his discussion of freedom of expression, 
Klein had used the examples of military officers criticizing orders and writers addressing 
religious issues; see " ~ b e r  Denk- und Druckfreiheit," Berlinische Monatsschrift, 3 (1784),  
327-28 (Hinske, 404-5). 
83 Laursen, "The Subversive Kant," 589, suggests that Kant focused on the clergy 
and matters of religion because "he probably felt that this would meet the least opposition 
from Frederick the Great's censors." 
84 For Mendelssohn's critique, see Gesammelte Schrifen, VIII, 13 1-42 (Jerusalem, tr. 
Allan Arkush [Hanover, N.H., 19831, 63-75). For a discussion of the Lutheran symbolic 
books and of Nicolai's novel, see Altmann's commentary in Arkush's translation of 
Jerusalem, 192. 
85 Johann David Michaelis, review of Jerusalem, Orientalische und Exegetische Bib- 
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anti-Semitic-attack in an essay published in the January 1784 issue of 
the Berlinische Monat~schrift.~~ But Zollner's criticisms were more serious. 
He argued that Mendelssohn's indifference to the distinction between 
"religion" and ccchurch" obscured the fact that a church, as a community 
of individuals devoted to the cause of advancing a religion, is free, as 
other societies, to demand that its members affirm their allegiance to its 
general principle^.^' While Mendelssohn was justified in arguing that the 
vocabulary of "rights" and c'duties" was inappropriate in discussions of 
the relationships between God and the faithful which constitute religion, 
this did not mean that churches, as social institutions, could not impose 
duties on their members.88 
This question of the limits of those duties which bound an official of 
a church stood at the center of Kant's discussion of the relationship 
between public and private uses of reason. With Ziillner-and implicitly 
against Mendelssohn-Kant argued that, insofar as they were fulfilling 
their responsibilities to the church as an institution, clergymen must 
adhere to the teachings of the church even in those cases where they 
might have reservations as to their truth. What an individual taught as 
an officer of the church "is presented by him as something which he is 
not empowered to teach at his own discretion, but which he is employed 
to expound in a prescribed manner and in someone else's name. " 
He will say: Our church teaches this or that, and these are the arguments it 
uses. He then extracts as much practical value as possible for his congregation 
from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with full conviction, but 
liothek (1783), 22:326, 59-99 and 22:332, 165-70. J. F. Zllner, ~ b e r~ o s e sMendelssohns 
Jerusalem (Berlin, 1784). 
86 "ijber die 39 Artikel der englischen Kirche und deren Beschworung," Berlinische 
Monatsschrifr, 3 (1784), 24-41 (Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schrifen, 8, 213-24). Men- 
delssohn's criticism of the Anglican equivalent of the symbolic books, the "Thirty-Nine 
Articles," had prompted Michaelis to charge that Mendelssohn had slandered the English 
clergy and to solicit a letter from England critical of Mendelssohn's discussion of the 
Thirty-Nine Articles. The relevant parts of Michelis's review are reprinted in Mendels- 
sohn, Gesammelte Schriften, VIII, 207-13; for a discussion of the affair, see Altmann, 
Moses Mendelssohn, 530-3 1, and Eberhard Giinter Schulz, "Kant und die Berliner Auf- 
klarung," Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz 1974, Teil 11, 1: Sektionen, 
ed. Gerhard Funke (Berlin, 1974), 60-80. Schulz's essay is virtually unique in the literature 
on the exchanges between Kant and Mendelssohn in that it offers a reason for Kant's 
suggestion that his reflections and Mendelssohn's might "coincide by chance": AA VIII, 
42 (Political Writings, 60). Schulz speculates that Kant had read Mendelssohn's response 
to Michaelis and guessed that the announced essay on "What is Enlightenment?" would, 
like Kant's own essay, respond to the points raised by Gllner. 
''Zollner, 58-59. As Schultz notes (64-65), Ziillner's distinction between church and 
religion was later employed by Kant in his Rechtslehre (AA VI, 327). 
''For a discussion of Zllner's argument, see Schulz, 64-66. In Mendelssohn's defense, 
it should be noted that Jerusalem was not completely indifferent to the distinction between 
religion-as a set of beliefs-and the church-as an institution. See Mendelssohn, Ge-
sammelte Schriften, VIII, 110 (Jerusalem, 41) and Altmann's commentary to the trans- 
lation, 143, 168. 
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which he can nevertheless undertake to expound, since it is not entirely impossible 
that they may contain truth.89 
The interest of Kant's clergyman is in the practical, not the dogmatic, 
dimension of religion. It is "not entirely impossible" that the doctrines 
of the church are true-but in any case the lesson of the Critique of Pure 
Reason is that religion is a matter of practical faith, not of theoretical 
~ertainty.~'There is, however, a limit on how far a clergyman may go 
in maintaining this separation between official dogma and personal con- 
viction: "nothing contrary to the essence of religion" must be present in 
the teachings of the church, for if this were the case the clergyman 
ccwould not be able to carry out his official duties in good conscience, 
and would have to resign. "91 
In much of this Kant was simply invoking existing Prussian 
In cases brought before the "Spiritual Department" in 1776 and again 
in 1783, Baron von Zedlitz, the head of the department, ruled that while 
clergy may write whatever they please in theological or philosophical 
articles addressed to the reading public, they must be careful to distinguish 
these scholarly opinions from their responsibilities as representatives of 
the church in their parishes.93 Kant was undoubtedly familiar with the 
cases: the 1776 case involved the Konigsberg clergyman Johann August 
Starck, and the 1783 case involved a book by Johann Heinrich Schulz 
which Kant reviewed in the Konigsberg Rasonnirenden Biichverzeichnis 
shortly after its publi~at ion.~~ In equating "the age of enlightenment" 
with "the century of Frederick," Kant must have had in mind decisions 
such as these. Under Frederick's "enlightened" rule, Kant wrote, "ven-
erable clergy, without offense to their official duties, may in their capacity 
as scholars [Gelehrten]freely and publicly submit to the judgment of the 
world their verdicts and opinions, even if they deviate here and there 
from orthodox doctrine [angenommenen Symbol]. "95 Those consequences 
of enlightenment which troubled the members of the Mittwochsgesellschaft 
89 AA VIII, 38 (Political Writings, 56). 
For a discussion, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970). 
9' AA VIII, 38 (Political Writings, 56-57). Significantly, Kant does not discuss whether 
there are cases when military officers would be justified in resigning their commissions 
rather than carrying out orders; nor is there a suggestion as to whether there might be 
cases when citizens would be justified in renouncing their citizenship, rather than sup- 
porting their government's actions. Kant's failure to consider examples of possible clashes 
between private and public uses of reason in areas other than the particular example of 
the clergy lends support to Schulz's suggestion that the distinction between public and 
private uses of reason was largely formulated as a response to the discussion of religious 
oaths in Zollner's critique of Mendelssohn's Jerusalem. 
92 This was first pointed out by Beyerhaus, "Kants 'Program' der AufklZirung." 
93 Beyerhaus, 16 1-64, reproduces the relevant documents. 
94 Ibid., 158-59 and Schulz 69; for Kant's review of J. H. Schulz's Versuch einer 
Anleitung zur Sittenlehre fur alle Menschen, ohne Unterschied der Religion, see AA, VIII, 
9-14, and the brief discussion in Michel Despland, Kant on History and Religion (Mont-
real, 1973), 21-22. 
95 AA, VIII, 40-41 (Political Writings, 58-59). 
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were avoided by Kant thanks to a compromise which found a pithy 
summary in the maxim he credited to Frederick: "Argue as much as you 
like and about what you like, but obey! "96 
While Mendelssohn suggested that a conflict between the "enlight- 
enment of man" and the "enlightenment of the citizen" could force 
philosophy into silence, Kant saw little need for concern. The "enlight- 
enment of man" was advanced by scholars addressing the reading public; 
what Mendelssohn had called the "enlightenment of the citizen" was a 
matter for the "private" use of reason. There was no need to fear the 
consequences of enlightenment: the free public use of reason was "the 
most innocuous form" of freedom, since the scholarly reflections which 
take place in the public sphere pose no threat to the functioning of the 
private ~phere.~'  The private sphere remained undisturbed because of a 
"strange and unexpected pattern in human affairs": "A high degree of 
civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's intellectual freedom, yet 
it also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of 
civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its 
fullest extent. "98 Frederick could well afford to let citizens argue as much 
as they liked; he had on hand "a well-disciplined and numerous army 
to guarantee the public security." A ruler of a "republic" (Freistaat) 
could not risk allowing the same freedom of public discussion-in the 
absence of a large army, the free public use of reason might have less 
than innocuous consequence^.^^ 
It is thus only at first glance that the essays of Kant and Mendelssohn 
lead us away from questions of power and politics and tempt us with a 
"philosophical" definition of the enlightenment. Both essays were con- 
tributions to a tradition of discourse in which the question "What is 
Enlightenment?" was not a matter of idle speculation but rather a trou- 
bling political dilemma. Kant and Mendelssohn attacked the question at 
a higher level of abstraction and, in so doing, provided a few stirring 
quotations for commentators who would subsequently discuss the ques- 
tion "What is Enlightenment?" with little appreciation for the political 
significance of the issue in eighteenth century Prussia. Yet neither Kant 
nor Mendelssohn could ignore the problems which troubled those 
"friends of enlightenment" who, taking a respite from their chores within 
the Prussian bureaucracy, gathered every other Wednesday evening and 
asked what enlightenment was, why there was so little of it, and what 
might happen if there was too much of it. 
Boston University. 
96 Ibid., 37 (Political Writings, 5 5 ) .  

97 Ibid., 36-37 (Political Writings, 5 5 ) .  

98 Ibid., 4 1 (Political Writings, 5 9 ) .  
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